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Background: Community health workers (CHWs) have been central to broadening the access and coverage of
preventative and curative health services worldwide. Much has been debated about how to best remunerate and
incentivize this workforce, varying from volunteers to full time workers. Policy bodies, including the WHO and
USAID, now advocate for regular stipends.
Methods: This qualitative study examines the perspective of health programme managers from 16 international
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who directly oversee programmes in resource-limited settings. It aimed
to explore institutional guidelines and approaches to designing CHW incentives, and inquire about how NGO
managers are adapting their approaches to working with CHWs in this shifting political and funding climate. Second,
it meant to understand the position of stakeholders who design and manage non-governmental organization-run
CHW programmes on what they consider priorities to boost CHW motivation. Individuals were recruited using typical
case sampling through chain referral at the semi-annual CORE Group meeting in the spring of 2012. Semi-structured
interviews were guided by a peer reviewed tool. Two reviewers analyzed the transcripts for thematic saturation.
Results: Six key factors influenced programme manager decision-making: National-level government policy, donor
practice, implicit organizational approaches, programmatic, cultural, and community contexts, experiences and values
of managers, and the nature of the work asked of CHWs. Programme managers strongly relied on national government
to provide clear guidance on CHW incentives schemes. Perspectives on remuneration varied greatly, from fears that it is
unsustainable, to the view that it is a basic human right, and a mechanism to achieve greater gender equity.
Programme managers were interested in exploring career paths and innovative financing schemes for CHWs, such as
endowment funds or material sales, to heighten local ownership and sustainability of programmes. Participants also
supported the creation of both national-level and global interfaces for sharing practical experience and best practices
with other CHW programmes.
Conclusion: Prescriptive recommendations for monetary remuneration, aside from those coming from national
governments, will likely continue to meet resistance by NGOs, as contexts are nuanced. There is growing consensus
that incentives should reflect the nature of the work asked of CHWs, and the potential for motivation through
sustainable financial schemes other than regular salaries. Programme managers advocate for greater transparency and
information sharing among organizations.
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Community health workers (CHWs) have been central
to broadening access and coverage of preventative and
curative health services worldwide for over 50 years
[1,2]. More recently, human resource limitations in
the Millennium Development Goals era have spurred a
renewed focus on ‘task-shifting’ primary care responsi-
bilities to lower-level health workers [3]. From volun-
teers to employees, their role varies between clinical
providers and mediators of the health care system to
agents of community empowerment. They are account-
able to both the organizations and the communities they
work in, with vastly different sets of obligations, expecta-
tions and recognition. This tension has been central to
the longstanding debate about how best to incentivize
and remunerate CHWs in order to motivate and support
their work [4].
After decades of diverting CHW cadres as agents of
vertical programmes, there is renewed interest in the
core principle of Alma Ata of strengthening health sys-
tems as a whole [5-7]. The President’s Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) have committed ‘to
increasing the number of functional CHWs serving in
maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH) priority
countries by at least 100,000 by 2013’ [8]. There is
growing interest in sharing best practices to develop,
monitor and evaluate sustainable community-based pro-
grammes. This has revealed discordant views on how to
define the role of CHWs within health care systems, and
appropriate incentives for their services. Until recently,
few organizations - or even Ministries of Health - have
chosen to be prescriptive given the wide range of suc-
cessful programme models.
This tension is in part due to the nature of the work
of CHWs, often first a mediator between communities
and the health care system, but also because of the com-
plex nature of the relationship between incentives, mo-
tivation and performance. Motivation is defined as ‘the
act or process of giving someone a reason for doing
something’ [9]. In a human resource management con-
text, incentives are the rewards - financial, material, and
non-material rewards, including recognition - that motiv-
ate a desired behaviour or performance [10]. Motivational
theory was recently popularized by social scientist Dan
Pink. After reviewing the large body of research on the
complex interplay between intrinsic (internal motivators
such as altruism) and extrinsic incentives (external moti-
vators such as money), he defines ‘autonomy, mastery and
purpose’ as the pillars of motivation, and proposes that
payment or performance-based incentives have the poten-
tial to extinguish intrinsic motivation, diminish perform-
ance, and crush creativity [10]. This may have practical
applications in the CHW context [11]. Some studies ofCHW cadres suggest that while financial incentives do not
necessarily crowd-out intrinsic motivation, non-financial
incentives are more effective at bolstering motivation
[12]. Others demonstrate that pro-social, altruistic,
personal growth and religious motivations can coexist
with hopes for employment, or career aspirations for
the future [13-19].
The most thorough review of CHW incentives to date,
by Bhattacharya et al., identified a number of key non-
monetary elements that foster motivation, including
community embeddedness, formal recognition, frequent
supervision, training opportunities, a supportive political
environment, and connecting the person’s work to a
higher purpose [12]. Intrinsic incentives promoted a
sense of self-worth and value, in tandem with extrinsic
incentives, both monetary and non-monetary [12]. Ma-
terial incentives included salaries, per diems, drug sales,
and pay per performance. They found evidence that
attrition rates were generally higher in volunteer pro-
grammes [20], but those paid inadequate or inconsistent
stipends also experienced high attrition [20-22]. Non-
material incentives, including preferential access to credit,
health care, and inclusion in development programmes,
were highly effective motivators. Job aids, including
T-shirts, backpacks, bicycles and agricultural tools were
found to promote pride, group solidarity and facilitate
entry into households. Government ministries and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) alike struggled with
how to sustain financial incentives. Payment also required
exceptional supervision systems and accountability, but
this sometimes worked to strengthen programming as a
whole. The review identified a number of major gaps in
operational research, including the cause of retention and
dropout rates; effect of innovative financing and credit
schemes; and the value of career paths for CHWs.
There are a few, often cited examples of where CHWs
have been fully integrated into national health care
systems and paid a salary, including the Brazilian Family
Health Programme, the Ethiopian Health Extension
Programme, and the Malawian Essential Health Package
[23]. The Kenyan experience highlights the challenges in
mandating financial remuneration for CHWs: the Na-
tional Health and Human Resources plan initially
recommended a standard minimum wage for CHWs,
but later entered a clause that stated that this was
dependent on the resources available to partner organi-
zations, recognizing that the national government did
not have sufficient funding [24]. High-resource settings
also struggle to define CHWs as ‘employees’ versus
agents ‘of the community’ [25-28]. In Massachusetts for
example, CHWs recently established board certification
to obtain recognition as health care workers and allow-
ing them to advance in the workforce, a move which
was highly controversial [29].
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2001 [12], a number of key policy documents have opted
to more narrowly define appropriate CHW incentives.
The WHO, which previously had left remuneration to
the organization’s discretion [30], now suggests that
while volunteers make valuable contributions to short-
term or part-time labour, formal remuneration is neces-
sary for the long-term sustainability of CHW pro-
grammes [23]. They propose that adequate wages help
retain human resources for health, especially in rural
areas and among marginal communities, and may con-
tribute to broader human development and poverty re-
duction strategies. The 2008 recommendations explicitly
state that ‘the burden of evidence indicates that stipends,
travel allowances and other non-financial incentives are
not enough to ensure the livelihood of health workers and
that the absence of adequate wages will threaten the
effectiveness and long-term sustainability of community
health worker programmes’ [31]. The NGO Code of
Conduct for Health Systems Strengthening, a formal
statement signed by leading international and national
NGOs, called for NGOs to ‘advocate for fair monetary
compensation for work done by all employees, across the
health care system, including salaries for community
health workers’ [32]. The USAID toolkit to assess the
functionality of CHW programmes employs similar lan-
guage to suggest that incentives be ‘balanced, with both
financial and non-financial incentives provided, and are
in line with expectations placed on CHWs; for example,
number and duration of visits to clients, workload, and
services provided. Incentives are partially based on perform-
ance relevant to expectations, and include advancement
opportunities and/or certification; community offers gifts or
rewards’ [33]. While the language remains purposefully
vague, it is the first recommendation of its kind to add
the consideration of workload and the type of services
provided, as well as the importance of career opportun-
ities for CHWs.
The extent to which governments and NGOs have
responded to these policy recommendations is unclear.
Compelling arguments for better compensation for CHW
labour continue to surface in the qualitative literature
[13-19]. This arena is often polarized between those who
see CHW payment for labour as both an ethical impera-
tive and a gendered social justice issue - where men are
paid salaries and females are asked to volunteer - and
those whose focus remains on non-monetary incentives
and worry that wages undermine the altruistic voluntary
nature of ‘lay health advising’. There is also concern that
the WHO [31] recommendations risk overemphasizing
payment, and skew the focus away from effective material
and non-material incentives [34].
This qualitative study examines the perspective of
international NGO health programme managers whodirectly oversee CHW programmes in resource-limited
settings. It aims to draw on their common experiences in
designing and implementing CHW incentives schemes in
order to generate and sustain motivation. This study has
two objectives. First, to explore institutional guidelines
and approaches to designing CHW incentives, and inquire
about how NGO managers are adapting their approaches
to working with CHWs in this shifting political and
funding climate. Second, to understand the position of
stakeholders who design and manage NGO-run CHW
programmes on what they consider priorities to boost
CHW motivation.
This is the first study to specifically inquire about how
NGO managers perceive the concepts of motivation and
sustainability in the current political and funding con-
text, and to explore the role of institutional, inter-
national and national policies in influencing programme
managers and their programme design. Understanding
current practices and existing tensions will help inform
CHW programme design and policy recommendations
at both the local and international level.
Methods
Qualitative inquiry [35] was chosen to generate detailed de-
scriptions from NGO programme managers about their ex-
perience, perceptions, tensions, intentions and behaviours
surrounding CHW motivation at both the local and inter-
national policy level. The study had ethics approval from
the McGill University Faculty of Medicine. Verbal informed
consent was obtained from each participant. Pseudonyms
were used during transcription to ensure anonymity.
Study participants: individuals were recruited using
typical case sampling through chain referral at the semi-
annual CORE Group meeting in the spring of 2012 [36].
All participants worked for affiliate member NGOs of
the US-based CORE Group, a network of NGO and
government partners that shares best practices and
programmatic expertise in community-focused public
health practice to impact maternal and child survival.
Data collection: a peer-reviewed semi-structured inter-
view guide was developed based on an extensive search
of peer reviewed and grey literature on CHW motivation
and incentives. The central themes identified in the
Bhattacharyya et al. [12] review formed the framework
for the guide. The tool was then circulated among well-
known topic experts with international NGOs and USAID
for their feedback (Additional file 1). In total, 17 in-depth,
semi-structured interviews were conducted until satur-
ation on prominent themes was achieved. Consent was
obtained to tape-record the sessions and the interviews
were transcribed and, where they were conducted in
French, translated into English by JH.
Data analysis: two of the authors (JH and MRBL) ana-
lyzed and coded the transcripts through multiple readings
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then together, using TAMSanalyzer software to organize
the data [37]. Thematic content analysis was an itera-
tive process of identifying major themes and identify-
ing points of discordance between the two researchers
for consideration.
Results
A total of 17 programme managers were interviewed
from 16 NGOs. Both expatriates and locally-hired
programme managers were interviewed, with programme
management positions ranging from one programme in
one country, to multiple programmes across different na-
tions; a few were based in their organization’s regional or
central headquarters. All had experience in CHW pro-
grammes prior to working with their current organiza-
tions, and all had experience with directly managing
country-level community health worker programmes.
Informants identified several key, often-dissonant factors
that influence how incentives are developed (Additional
file 2): organizational structure (available resources and
implicit policies), context (programmatic, cultural, com-
munity dynamics), experiences and values of programme
managers, the nature of the tasks asked of CHWs, and
both donor practices and national-level government pol-
icy. These influencing factors are embedded here under
the umbrellas themes of: national policy and health sys-
tems context; monetary; and non-monetary incentives for
ease of discussion around these topics.
National policy and heath systems context
All informants looked to national policies and norms to
first guide their design of CHW incentive packages. They
described this as both their personal and institutional ap-
proach to determining CHW incentives, with a few excep-
tions of organizations that pushed the envelope in terms
of what countries will allow (them) to pay CHW’ (Inform-
ant 4). Many called for standardized national systems; they
voiced that Ministries of Health and Finance should have
a more prominent leadership and regulatory role to help
standardize how NGOs work with CHWs in the country,
and increasingly saw their role as collaborators with na-
tional and district governments. A few advocated for a
‘systems approach’, consisting of multiple cadres of health
workers, chosen by the community, with equity between
equivalent-level workers, and a in-built career ladder.
They felt this would avoid vertical programmes competing
for CHWs with vastly different incentive schemes.
At the same time, informants offered examples where
central governments have attempted to standardize
CHW programmes by setting minimum salaries - either
provided by the central government or set as a mini-
mum for NGOs to pay CHWs - with minimal impact or
unintended consequences. One programme managervoiced concern that CHWs were underperforming, des-
pite nationally-set salaries, which threatened the long-
term sustainability of the programme and ‘undermined
the ownership of the (…) messages’ (Informant 11). An-
other CHW programme was described as a ‘really low
paid civil servants programme … they do just the min-
imal amount and get their money’. In these cases, many
reported that NGOs ‘top up’ these salaries, that is pro-
vide extra incentives in addition of the recommended
wages, in an attempt to increase motivation and per-
formance, especially within HIV programmes (Informant
4). One West African country had recently announced
that all NGOs had to pay a set salary to all CHWs, with
major concerns raised by programme managers: ‘e would
have given bicycles, supplies, been able to increase super-
vision and support, plenty of job aids, T-shirts, badges …
Would’ve given everything! But now the budget is so re-
stricted that we’re unable to provide a lot of these things
and the money will go into salaries’ (Informant 5).
Underlying the discourse on the role of national leader-
ship and guidelines was the mandate of the NGO itself in
building the capacity of the national health systems: ‘(Our)
objective is not to provide jobs for community health
workers; our goal is to reduce maternal and child mortality’
(Informant 14). Programme managers described inherent
tension between their programme objectives, donor-driven
decisions, and the theoretical goal of supporting the Minis-
try of Health objectives and health system strengthening.
Inequity, inconsistency, and competition between pro-
grammes in the context of short-term funding cycles
were cited by most as major barriers to sustainability,
long-term motivation and effective human resource
capacity building in CHW programmes. The influx of
short-term programmes within unequal incentives were
described as ‘destructive’ and ‘damaging’, and threatening
the integrity of long-term CHW programmes - both gov-
ernment and NGO-supported - and subsequently, health
system strengthening as a whole.
Informants asked Ministries of Health and donors to
support long-term strategic objectives in CHW pro-
grammes to avoid the current tension between short-
term programmatic goals and the long-term viability of
CHW programmes. Programme managers requested a
centralized information data source, organized by coun-
try or regions, to document experience to date with
CHW programmes. This platform would showcase high-
quality operations research, and work to share local ex-
perience with monetary and non-monetary incentives,
and document existing programmes.
Monetary incentives: varying perspectives
Pay for work as unsustainable
Informants spoke from their experience seeing CHW-
rooted programmes collapse after financial incentives
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port a system like that, why would you ever start one?
We can’t do what we’re doing without (CHWs)’ (Inform-
ant 14). Short-term or one-off payments from other
international agencies also were viewed as undermining
long-term objectives of CHW programmes. Many de-
scribed resistance from donor agencies to incorporate fi-
nancial incentives if they could not be sustained after
the close of the programme, highlighting the implicit im-
pact of donor practices on incentive design. The true
cost of paying large cadres of CHWs regular stipends
were an ‘enormous amount’ (Informant 17), and ‘expen-
sive’ (Informant 15). This pushed programmes to ‘move
away from payment or incentives to other forms of com-
pensation that may be more sustainable’ (Informant 15).
There were a number of problems that were specific
to salaries as the chosen from of financial remuneration.
‘Salaries are never enough’ (Informant 11), and yield col-
lective power to cadres of CHWs who may try to re-
negotiate their pay, and in one instance, went on strike.
Others countered that ‘it is human nature’ and CHWs
will always ask for more incentives, describing instances
where transport costs or bicycle repairs had to be rene-
gotiated. Programme managers were alerted to their
dissatisfaction indirectly through the CHWs’ direct su-
pervisors, or when they themselves made field visits.
Several informants explicitly distrusted the motivations
of salaried CHWs: ‘They may actually ensure that there
are some resistant families so that they continue to have
a job!’ (Informant 8); ‘people need to extract as much out
of (the programme) as possible’ (Informant 17). One
participant felt that money attracted men more than
women, with potentially the ‘wrong’ motivations:
‘If you make something a well-paid job it tends to attract
men, and you push women out of the equation. Because
if they could be in a full-time job, they already would be.
So now you’re attracting men to the job who are
motivated by the salary, but are not necessarily
motivated by the right things. And there you get your
difference in performance’. (Informant 15)
All informants unambiguously stated that pay is insuffi-
cient to motivate performance, and highlighted that
‘… there are people who keep your money and they move
on. There are community health workers who are really
doing nothing. So motivation is complex’ (Informant 5).Pay for work as a right
A number of informants were critical of the discourse
around CHW stipends being unsustainable, citing the on-
going fixation on volunteerism as ideological, ‘almost a re-
ligion’ (Informant 4). Their language was impassioned andthey equated monetary compensation with respect (Infor-
mants 3, 4, 8, 12 and 16):
‘It’s not spoiling someone to give them a salary. You
are economically empowering them and they will
probably do a better job. Why should we have different
standards for them and us. If I’m fired from my
present job than I will look for something else. (…) If
they were men - why are there no male community
health volunteers? So why are women expected to work
for free?’ (Informant 8)
In addition to gender bias, many illustrated that there
was also a double standard implied with paying some
workers and not others: ‘I hate the idea that this is
about someone’s heart’s calling. That means that you
and I should also not be paid if this is our heart’s calling’
(Informant 3).
While many other informants rejected blanket recom-
mendations of salaries, many expressed guilt from
having managed programmes where CHWs were over-
worked, undercompensated, or both, and wished they
could have done more to recognize and compensate
them at that time: ‘I met a community health worker the
other day and he explained how many hours a day he
spent on his role, which meant that he was doing two
jobs, and then it felt more difficult that we weren’t giving
any money for his job. His time was precious, he has nine
children, I felt quite badly actually that we weren’t giving
anything for that part of his time’ (Informant 13).Middle ground: incorporating context and the burden
of work
Other informants did not have set ideas about remuner-
ation for CHWs, and described an evolution in their
thinking over the course of their careers. Several de-
scribed starting their careers believing that all CHWs
should be paid salaries, and now felt that there is no one
size fits all; that incentives should be adapted to histor-
ical, cultural, and contextual realities: ‘At a time when
they were huge number of people infected with treatable
infectious diseases (…) these questions we had to cut with
a blunt knife. We said “we need to pay them, we need to
get value, we need to get these programmes scaled up”.
Now I think (…) there are subtle areas. I do think that
there are different cadres that can be incentivized with
different mechanisms’ (Informant 4). Even those infor-
mants whose organizations or personal philosophies
championed monetary incentives as a right didn’t neces-
sarily view money as the root of motivation and high
performance: ‘(Money is) never enough. (…) But does this
really motivate community health workers, that is still
the question’ (Informant 9).
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work itself. Respondents described the nature of some
CHW work where they have set targets, little control
over their time, or ‘something that interferes with people’s
daily lives’ (Informant 15) as the type of work that re-
quires monetary compensation (Informants 2, 4, 13, 10
and 15). ‘If you have somebody working every day, going
house to house, giving the medicine, going back and forth
to the clinic … then the salary makes more sense’
(Informant 4).
Nearly all participants voiced the importance of local
and national context in making recommendations for
CHW incentive packages across and between countries
and regions. There were concerns that CHWs were over-
worked and undervalued in the context of constantly
changing incentives and programmatic objectives.
One informant reiterated the fact that the long history
of one programme is what makes their success possible
today: ‘Now we don’t appreciate what it was like before
the road was built. So right now if you have a small pot-
hole, you complain a lot. We don’t imagine what it was
like when there was no tarmac. What the vitamin A
programme did - is it paved the road’ (Informant 2).
Given the nuance of the history of each CHW cadre and
difficulties in defining competencies and workload, there
was pervasive discomfort with the idea of universal
guiding principles and blanket descriptions to the devel-
opment of effective programmes as ‘there are lot of
variables in terms of satisfaction’ (Informant 4), ‘different
situations, different programmes, and different contexts’
(Informant 2). ‘ … what a community health worker is
doing in Afghanistan, Mongolia, or urban versus rural
sub-Saharan Africa is really quite different’ (Informant 1).
Alternative financing schemes
Many informants expressed interest and positive experi-
ences with less traditional forms of monetary support
for CHWs, especially in the cases where a CHW may
not have extensive daily tasks or data collection duties
that might require salaried work. Informants cited
community-based microfinance programmes, small en-
terprise training, and drug and other material sales as
more sustainable incentives that, in some cases, may
prove to be more motivating, particularly if it ‘allows
them to earn money down the line (while) contribut(ing)
to their community’ (Informant 17); ‘ … where people got
drugs that they can sell, they get recognition from their
communities to be the special envoy to any special guests
to the area and special recognition’ (Informant 16).
An informant familiar with the Female Community
Health Volunteer (FCHV) programme in Nepal elabo-
rated on a series of income-generating and financing
schemes that linked community health volunteers to
existing income-generating projects, and developed asavings credits fund, financed by community leaders,
which later evolved into a emergency loans fund for
FCHVs that could be used for their personal and small
business emergencies. Expansion of their responsibilities
to include community-based treatment of pneumonia was
seen to warrant a monetary incentive, ideally through a
self-renewable source of financing. See Additional file 3
for the story in his words.‘It takes more than money’: non-material incentives
Programme managers agreed that status, recognition,
and a genuine sense of purpose in their jobs were the
most important tenants of CHW motivation, and by
extension, of their performance, satisfaction and re-
tention. Managers explicitly helped CHWs see the
bigger picture early on in the project, and involved
them in the design and roll out of the programme so
that they ‘buy into the objectives of the programme’
(Informant 16). They found that explicit efforts to en-
gage CHWs as growing professionals, including activ-
ities such as ‘training their peers’ and ‘celebrating
(their) knowledge’ (Informant 15), resulted in a more
active, engaged cadre of health workers.
Recognition took many forms. Material incentives like
badges, T-shirts, certificates and job aids helped CHWs
directly to help gain recognition from their own communi-
ties. Informants referred to broader strategies to recognize
their work, through regular supportive supervision, the use
of radio announcements, ceremonies, or representation on
committees together with local government. Public recog-
nition alongside celebrities or respected politicians was a
deliberate strategy to heighten the credibility of female
CHWs, and CHW programmes were seen as an opportun-
ity to empower women. While little was mentioned in
regards to community recognition, informants described
their role as managers in affording recognition: ‘Just being
as humble and grateful as possible, and simply recognize
how difficult it this work is, and how far even that can go.
But it has to be consistent, and it has to be genuine’
(Informant 10).
Inconsistent management and oversight was a major
challenge in programmes. Insufficient and irregular super-
vision negatively affects motivation, and programme man-
agers found it difficult to measure performance and keep
mid-level managers and CHWs accountable in their
programmes. Several informants suggested that regular sti-
pends could work to improve supervision, with the advan-
tage of being able to dismiss under-performing CHWs if
needed. However, this doesn’t negate the essential role of
supervision and support, and ‘ … (they)’re not always doing
the follow-up that (they) should. (They) should be doing
visits with them to see how they’re doing it. It’s time-
intensive’ (Informant 7).
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A wide range of CHW competencies, roles and responsi-
bilities were reported, making it challenging to recom-
mend universal best practices in CHW motivation and
incentive schemes. Out of key factors that influence
CHW incentives - including national-level government
policy, donor practice, implicit organizational approaches
and structure, local context, experiences and values of
managers, and the nature of the work asked of CHWs -
donor practices and what other organizations and govern-
ments were offering CHWs had the biggest influence on
NGO practices, particularly in defining what is ‘sustain-
able’ beyond the duration of the programme. Surprisingly,
with a few notable exceptions, organizational policy and
philosophy did not consistently drive most organizational
approaches to CHW programming, and programmes were
often developed on a case-by-base basis. Other key consid-
erations in developing incentive packages were the desired
programmatic outcome, the workload and opportunity
cost for the CHW, and the nature of the work itself. Once
these elements are addressed, NGOs described a mix of
extrinsic incentives - including both monetary and non-
monetary material incentives - and intrinsic incentives tar-
geted at heightening CHW recognition and their sense of
purpose.
Many of these findings underpin the best practices in
CHW programming that have been described elsewhere
[12]. This study also has important limitations, as we did
not consult communities and affected CHWs directly.
However, this study highlights the perspective of the
NGO community, with a number of health policy issues
that merit careful consideration by governments, donors
and NGOs alike. The destructive nature of one-off pay-
ments and inequality of incentives between programmes
profoundly affects NGO-supported and government
community health worker cadres. The lack of central
oversight and pragmatic forums for information shar-
ing between organizations, and the persistent myopia
of short-term donor targets, were all cited as culprits.
Programme managers are seeking guidance from the
Ministries of Health in their initial approach to sup-
porting CHW programmes and dynamic online for-
ums for information sharing on CHW motivation
between organizations and governments. This presents
an opportunity for governments to recognize CHWs as a
major force in their strategies and their central role in ad-
dressing health system strengthening through partnerships
with NGOs. This would also strengthen the central
tenants of supervision, training, recognition, and possibly
career paths for these cadres of workers.
Payment has resided at the heart of recent debates in the
social science literature, WHO recommendations, and the
NGO health systems code of ethics [6,13,23,30,31,38,39].
Guilt, gender, the ethics of payment for work, andincreasingly overburdened CHWs all emerged as im-
portant themes in this work. Many informants at one
time felt that their programmes provided inadequate
remuneration or support for CHWs on the whole. The
problems with cash stipends raised here are also not
new. Inconsistent remuneration and fluctuating in-
kind payments both work to demotivate volunteers
[6,22]. The inequitable and variable distribution of
incentives between regions and programme was also
cited as an important problem in this study, and this
has been documented elsewhere [40]. Perhaps the
most interesting paradox described in this study is
that the potential of financial compensation to em-
power community workers, especially women, coexists
with managers’ distrust of their motivations and fear
that payment will give CHWs the power to arbitrate
for more compensation.
Incentives should remain context dependent, accord-
ing to many informants, with the caveat that different
types of community-based health work may be best
suited for different types of incentives. This is consistent
with the recent discourse surrounding CHW compensa-
tion, which underlines that a baseline wage is needed
when a volunteer cannot be expected to do the job
[11,37]. What is ‘too much work’ for a volunteer relies
not only on the autonomy and flexibility in job hours
and responsibilities, described above, but overall keeping
the workload light. Informants almost universally cited
door-to-door visits, Directly Observed Therapy Systems
(DOTS) with targets, and data collection as examples of
job descriptions that minimize the control CHWs have
over their time, and merit monetary compensation. Our
findings are in line with recent recommendations put
forth by Tom Davis, a US-based thought-leader in this
area, who put forth eight hours a week as a maximum
number of hours that a volunteer should work, and ad-
vocates that if you are going to pay CHWs, ‘give them a
lot to do, and pay them a fair wage’. He also submits
that a middle ground, with some small non-financial in-
centives and low pay, might indeed be the most danger-
ous motivational set-up, where CHWs are resentful of
an insulting, inadequate wage [11,22].
This leads to the expanding vision for fair monetary
and non-monetary incentive models, which considers
innovative approaches to monetary compensation, and
much more purposeful investment in human resources,
including continuing education, skills-training, and car-
eer ladders that honour the individual’s desire to grow in
their role, and move into other forms of employment.
Perhaps the most illuminating example was from the Fe-
male Community Health Volunteer (FCHV) programme
in Nepal, which has been hotly debated in the social sci-
ence literature, polarized between the perspectives of
male salaried public servants on the cultural merits of
B-Lajoie et al. Human Resources for Health 2014, 12:66 Page 8 of 9
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bias inherent in female volunteerism and the potential
for exploitation [34,17]. On closer inspection, we learn
that regular demands on FCHVs are typically less than
five hours a week, and more demanding tasks, such as an
immunization day, are financially compensated. FCHVs
also benefit from a ‘credits and savings programme’, which
informants considered a key factor in helping sustain their
motivation. These elements are notably absent in the de-
bates around ‘volunteerism’. Irrespective, these discussions
serve to highlight the complexity of investing in this essen-
tial tier of human resources for health.
Conclusion
This qualitative study provides unique insight from
NGO programme managers on the debate surrounding
how best to support CHW motivation. It highlights the
central role of Ministries of Health to drive national
standards and appropriate motivation schemes; NGO
partners are increasingly committed to supporting na-
tional programmes and policies, despite the short-term
vision of their donor-driven outputs. Our findings suggest
an expanding vision for fair monetary and non-monetary
incentive models, which will necessitate thoughtful invest-
ment in human resources, including continuing education,
skills-training, and career ladders that honour the individ-
ual’s desire to grow in their role, and potentially move into
other forms of employment. Participants called for high
quality operations research and documentation of current
practices in order to continue to address challenging
health needs, and strengthen existing community health
systems.
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